China’s Strategic Role in Arctic Environmental Governance Under the Climate-Sceptic Trump 2.0 Administration

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Road on the ice of the Barents Sea. Photo: Ehehey

The Arctic Institute China Series 2025

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The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2017 and the imposition of tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminium in 2018 signalled a prioritisation of economic nationalism and energy development over multilateral climate cooperation in the Arctic.¹⁾Baskaran G (2025) Canadian Tariffs Will Undermine U.S. Minerals Security. Center for Strategic & International Studies, 29 January, https://www.csis.org/analysis/canadian-tariffs-will-undermine-us-minerals-security. Accessed on 13 May 2025. These shifts also led to institutional stagnation in forums like the Arctic Council, as scientific cooperation and climate-focused working groups saw reduced United States’ engagement.²⁾Sfraga M (2025) The Transarctic Alliance is Key to US National Security. High North News, 5 May, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/transarctic-alliance-key-us-national-security. Accessed on 23 May 2025. The potential return of such policies under a second Trump presidency (Trump 2.0) raises the prospect of further disengagement from regional environmental governance frameworks. In contrast to the United States’ retreat, China has steadily capitalised on the opportunity to enhance its Arctic footprint and seems well-postioned to fill the governance vacuum left by a retreating United States under Trump 2.0.

China’s Arctic Policy

Over the past few decades, China has steadily signalled its growing interest in the Arctic region, transitioning from a marginal observer to an increasingly assertive stakeholder. This shift was formalised in its 2018 White Paper on Arctic Policy, which outlined China’s strategic objectives and framed its identity as a “near-Arctic state”.³⁾The State Council (2018) China’s Arctic Policy. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. Accessed on 25 May 2025. The document emphasised China’s commitment to scientific research, environmental protection, and participation in Arctic governance, while also promoting the development of the Polar Silk Road (PSR) as part of its broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s integration of Arctic strategy into national and subnational planning is matched by material investments in polar technology—such as icebreakers and shipbuilding—signalling a long-term bid for autonomous access and influence under its PSR vision.⁴⁾Eiterjord T (2025) Taking Stock of China’s Polar Fleet. The Diplomat, 5 April, https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/hold-taking-stock-of-chinas-polar-fleet/. Accessed on 23 May 2025. The White Paper also framed China as a responsible climate actor, citing commitments to environmental protection, polar research, and cooperation through Arctic Council.⁵⁾The State Council (2018) China’s Arctic Policy. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. Accessed on 25 May 2025. This policy paper also underscored China’s comitment to addressing global climate change, citing the Paris Agreement and pledging to expand polar climate research and monitory stations.

China was granted observer status in the Arctic Council in May 2013, following a six-year application process that began in 2007.⁶⁾Sun K (2014) Beyond the Dragon and the Panda: Understanding China’s Engagement in the Arctic. Asia Policy (18): 46–51. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24905275. Accessed on 22 May 2025 Prior to this, China had attended Arctic Council meetings as an ad hoc observer since 2006. The decision was widely welcomed in Chinese media and marked a significant milestone in China’s gradual institutional integration into Arctic governance. Yet as China’s Arctic diplomacy appears outwardly multilateral and cooperative, domestic strategic discourse offers a more revealing perspective. In internal Chinese academic and policy frameworks, the Arctic is categorised as an “important maritime interest” (重要海洋利益, zhongyao haiyang liyi) and a “strategic new frontier” (战略新疆域, zhanlüe xin jiangyu).⁷⁾Andersson P (2021) The Arctic as a “Strategic” and “Important” Chinese Foreign Policy Interest: Exploring the Role of Labels and Hierarchies in China’s Arctic Discourses. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 0(0).https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026211018699. Accessed on 28 May 2025 These labels place the Arctic within a second-tier hierarchy of geopolitical value, not equal to core interests like Taiwan or the South China Sea, but still crucial to China’s long-term vision as a maritime and global power. The “strategic new frontier” designation aligns the Arctic with outer space, cyberspace, and the deep sea: all seen as emerging domains of great power rivalry. By naming the Arctic in these terms, Chinese actors help institutionalise its relevance within broader state strategy, justify increasing resource allocation, and frame its governance role as part of China’s global rise. Beyond the geopolitical framing, China’s Arctic engagement also includes scientific research, polar technology development, and subnational interests – elements increasingly reflected in national and subnational five-year plans. More insight into this trajectory can be gleaned from specialised provincial planning documents rolled out since 2021.⁸⁾Eiterjord T (2023) What the 14th Five-Year Plan Says About China’s Arctic Interests. The Arctic Institute, 23 November, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/14th-five-year-plan-chinas-arctic-interests/. Accessed on 27 May 2025. This strategic framing underpins China’s diplomatic efforts to institutionalise its presence in Arctic forums and subtly advance its influence under the guise of multilateral cooperation. At the same time, China participates in Arctic Council working groups on environmental monitoring and protection, and operates the Yellow River Station in Svalbard to support polar climate research.⁹⁾The State Council (2018) China’s Arctic Policy. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. Accessed on 25 May 2025.

China’s deepening role

As Mike Sfraga – former United States Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs – has argued, the absence of consistent United States’ Arctic leadership risks ceding critical governance space to rivals, such as China, who are more proactive in shaping regional norms and infrastructure.¹⁰⁾Sfraga M (2025) The Transarctic Alliance is Key to US National Security. High North News, 5 May, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/transarctic-alliance-key-us-national-security. Accessed on 23 May 2025. He warned that “leadership in the Arctic is not a luxury but a necessity,” emphasising that inconsistency undermines trust with allies and hinders long-term strategic planning. In response to Trump 2.0-era tariffs, China has currently pledged to “fight to the end”¹¹⁾Megerian C, Boak J, Ting F, Bodeen C & Leung K (2025) China Says it Will ‘Fight to the End’ After Trump Threatens to Impose Still More Tariffs. Ap News, 22 May, https://apnews.com/article/china-us-tariffs-trade-trump-b5010acb08114304d8c36267b47eda13. Accessed on 28 May 2025. and enforced restrictions on the export of seven rare earth minerals – critical to the United States’ defence manufacturing and green technology sectors.¹²⁾Matthews W (2025) China’s Rare Earth Export Restrictions Threaten Washington’s Military Primacy. Chatham House, 22 May, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/chinas-rare-earth-export-restrictions-threaten-washingtons-military-primacy. Accessed on 25 May 2025. These countermeasures expose vulnerabilities in the United States’ industrial ambitions and highlight China’s growing leverage in strategic domains, aiming to influence relations with other Arctic states. Further, these economic countermeasures are not merely retaliatory; they form part of the broader strategy through which China seeks to enhance its Arctic influence by weakening United States’ credibility among its traditional allies.

China’s ties with Russia

China continues to deepen cooperation with Russia in the Arctic, especially as its broader efforts to establish port-related partnerships in Nordic countries such as Norway, Sweden, and Greenland have faced political and security roadblocks. Russia—with its extensive Arctic coastline—has been far more welcoming of Chinese investment, facilitating joint ventures under the PSR framework.¹³⁾Rotnem T (2025) Polar Partners? Russia and China in the Arctic. China Currents, Vol. 24, No. 2, https://www.chinacenter.net/2025/china-currents/24-2/polar-partners-russia-and-china-in-the-arctic/. Accessed on 11 August 2025. Projects such as Yamal LNG and collaboration on the NSR exemplify this strategic convergence. Yet such large-scale fossil fuel ventures sit uneasingly with China’s Paris climate commitments, raising doubts about whether its Arctic environmental rhetoric translates into practice. In 2024, for instance, Chinese company COSL Drilling Europe was authorised to drill in the Barents Sea under contracts with Norwegian firms Equinor and Vår Energi, despite repeated warnings from Norway’s domestic intelligence services about China’s growing ambitions in the Arctic.¹⁴⁾Staalesen A (2024) Chinese Rig Heads Towards Norwegian Arctic Drill Site. The Barents Observer, 8 November,https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/chinese-rig-heads-towards-norwegian-arctic-drill-site/420007. Accessed on 29 May 2025. This cooperation reflects how China is willing to pursue PSR objectives even amid political friction, positioning itself as a pragmatic and persistent Arctic actor.

However, this alignment with Russia is not without limits. China’s approach, centred on multilateralism, scientific cooperation, and environmental governance, contrasts with Russia’s focus on unilateral control, militarisation, and extractivism. This strategic divergence has caused China to also consider partnerships with other Arctic states.¹⁵⁾Dagaev A (2025) The Arctic Is Testing the Limits of the Sino-Russian Partnership. Carnegie Politika, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 18 February, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/02/russia-china-arctic-views?lang=en. Accessed on 29 May 2025. Kirkenes, a Norwegian port near the Barents Sea and close to the Russian border, holds strategic appeal for China. Its year-round ice-free status and potential rail links to Finland make it a prospective transshipment hub for cargo via the NSR.¹⁶⁾Youchang L & Shuhui Z (2018) Feature: Norway’s Arctic Town Envisions Gateway on Polar Silk Road with Link to China. Xinhuanet, 9 March, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/10/c_137029993.htm. Accessed on 28 May 2025. In this regard, China seeks not only access but legitimacy—emphasising cooperation, international norms, and multilateral forums to position itself as a stable actor in a contested region. These projects also raise environmental governance questions, as increased Arctic shipping carries risks for fragile polar ecosystems.

Resultantly, infrastructure development in Kirkenes has stalled, in part due to heightened scrutiny from Norway’s security apparatus, which views Chinese investment in critical infrastructure as a national risk.¹⁷⁾Bochove D (2024) China’s Arctic Dreams Make a Tiny Port a Global Prize. Bloomberg, 6 September, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-china-norway-russia-arctic-trade/. Accessed on 27 May 2025. This has strained Sino-Norwegian relations and curtailed China’s efforts to establish a Western-friendly Arctic foothold. Nevertheless, China appears committed to maintaining latent strategic opportunities like Kirkenes, should political conditions shift. The divergence in strategy between China and Russia has ultimately reinforced Beijing’s desire to diversify its Arctic partnerships, particularly in Europe’s northern frontier, balancing cooperation with Moscow against a broader push for multilateral legitimacy.

There are also rising concerns with the shifting geopolitical situation in the region as the increasing rivalry among the United States, China, and Russia forms a proxy for broader global power competition. Russia’s assertive Arctic strategy, driven by the melting ice caps, centres on securing access to newly available shipping lanes and vast natural resources—factors that have turned the region into a high-stakes geopolitical frontier.¹⁸⁾Gatopoulos A (2022) Which is Behind Russia’s Interest in a Warming Arctic? Al Jazeera, May, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/3/28/what-is-behind-russias-interest-in-a-warming-arctic. Accessed on 20 May 2025. Simultaneously, Russia’s strategic cooperation with China in the Arctic infrastructure and resource exploitation is alarming for the United States. The 2024 United States Department of Defense report also warned that this alignment between China and Russia extends across “multiple instruments of national power,”¹⁹⁾Al Jazeera (2024) US Wary of China-Russia Cooperation in Increasingly Strategic Arctic. Al Jazeera, 23 July, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/23/us-wary-of-china-russia-cooperation-in-increasingly-strategic-arctic. Accessed on 27 May 2025. raising concerns about destabilising activities such as GPS jamming and provocative military flights in the Arctic.

The May 2025 Xi-Putin summit further underscored the resilience of the China-Russia partnership amid the intensifying United States pressure. In a notable rhetorical shift, their joint statement omitted the long-standing “Three Noes” formulation—especially the assertion that the relationship is “not an alliance”—marking a departure from past language.²⁰⁾Wishnick E (2025) The Xi-Putin Summit: A Display of China-Russia Resilience on Victory Day. The Diplomat, 17 May, https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/the-xi-putin-summit-a-display-of-china-russia-resilience-on-victory-day/. Accessed on 27 May 2025. Instead, the statement described the partnership as having “unique strategic value” and rejected any external interference. While the partnership remains officially non-confrontational, this deliberate ambiguity allows for deeper coordination while deterring external scrutiny, particularly from the United States. Such signalling has direct implications for Arctic governance and security. Alongside this deepening China-Russia alignment, a parallel battleground for Arctic influence is emerging in Greenland.

Greenland and Arctic Security

Greenland’s geopolitical significance stems not only from its resource wealth and strategic location but also from the overlapping ambitions of the United States, China, and local authorities. Trump’s attempt to ‘purchase’ Greenland—and public assertion that “we’re going to get Greenland”²¹⁾Aikman I (2025) Trump He Believes US Will ‘Get Greenland.’ BBC, 26 January, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crkezj07rzro. Accessed on 29 May 2025. despite firm Danish and Greenlandic opposition—and the Pentagon’s subsequent decision to shift Greenland from European Command to U.S. Northern Command underscore Washington’s urgency to retain influence amid an evolving Arctic order.²²⁾McLeary, P. & Kine, P., (2025) Pentagon to Redraw Command Map to More Closely Align Greenland with the US. Politico, 2 June. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/06/02/pentagon-greenland-northern-command-00381223. Accessed 8 September 2025. Concurrently, despite Beijing’s cautious approach and limited follow-through, Greenland’s repeated overtures to China reflect ongoing power manoeuvring that underscores the island’s value in this critical Arctic gateway.²³⁾Andersson P (2025) Greenland Eyes China Amid Denmark-US Tensions – But Chinese Investors Won’t Rush In. The Diplomat, 24 April, https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/greenland-eyes-china-amid-denmark-us-tensions-but-chinese-investors-wont-rush-in/. Accessed on 28 May 2025. These sovereignty contests complicate the pursuit of unified environmental governance, as diverging national priorities and local interests hinder coordinated sustainable development efforts.

The United States’ intensified interest in Greenland reflects broader strategic imperatives tied to the Arctic’s emerging status as a critical northern maritime corridor. As climate change accelerates seasonal thawing, the Arctic Ocean is projected to become increasingly navigable, potentially reducing shipping times between Asia, Europe, and North America by up to 40%.²⁴⁾Arctic Review (n.d.) Northern Sea Route. https://arctic.review/future/northern-sea-route/. Accessed on 27 May 2025. This prospective PSR presents not only immense economic opportunities through faster trade and access to untapped natural resources but also a strategic challenge to the United States’ dominance of global sea lanes. In this context, Greenland’s location serves as a geopolitical fulcrum—control and influence here are essential for the United States to counterbalance growing Chinese and Russian ambitions in the Arctic. Without maintaining a foothold on Greenland, Washington risks losing leverage over these emerging Arctic routes, which could contribute to a gradual erosion of American hegemony in global trade and security dynamics.

US retreat and China’s rise?

These contrasting approaches of the United States and China have significant implications for the future of Arctic environmental governance. Under Trump 2.0, the United States’ climate scepticism and economic nationalism threaten to accelerate the erosion of multilateral institutions and cooperative frameworks that have maintained relative stability in the region. By retreating from global climate commitments and prioritising unilateral economic interests, Washington risks undermining the collaborative stewardship crucial for managing the Arctic’s complex environmental challenges. For the United States, maintaining influence in the region remains vital to preserving the existing global order and its hegemonic role. While some scholars highlight Russian ambivalence toward China’s Arctic ambitions, the broader governance vacuum left by a retreating Trump 2.0 administration also positions China to deepen bilateral ties with Nordic states and leverage multilateral environmental diplomacy to enhance its Arctic legitimacy, concerning Washington.²⁵⁾Wishnick E (2021) Will Russia Put China’s Arctic Ambitions on Ice? China’s Resource Risks, 3 June, https://www.chinasresourcerisks.com/post/will-russia-put-china-s-arctic-ambitions-on-ice. Accessed on 27 May 2025.

These methods align with China’s emphasis on multilateralism, scientific cooperation, and climate adaptation to project soft power and gain legitimacy among both Arctic and non-Arctic actors. Through active engagement in Arctic Council working groups and investments linked to its PSR, China presents itself as a stable, globally engaged actor. However, its growing influence raises questions about balancing economic development with environmental protection, especially given the broader BRI ambitions. China’s strategic use of export restrictions to deter allied cooperation further complicates Washington’s ability to rally partners, a challenge compounded by the United States’ tariffs alienating traditional allies.

Meanwhile, the Xi-Putin partnership, though framed as a personal alliance, aims to project stability amid perceived Western volatility. Putin’s pledge of “constant personal control” and Xi’s invocation of historical ties demonstrate a calculated coherence that China leverages to bolster its Arctic presence as the United States retreats from climate diplomacy and strains alliances. China’s framing of the Arctic as an “important maritime interest” and “strategic new frontier” elevates the region’s priority within its policy system, legitimising deeper engagement. As the Arctic shifts from a cooperative to a competitive space, China’s calculated engagement, framed as multilateral but motivated by strategic gain, could redefine the environmental governance architectures for years to come. China thus projects both a cooperative, climate-conscious identity and a pragmatic extractive agenda, leaving its role in Arctic environmental governance contested between its multilateral climate rhetoric and its pursuit of extractive opportunities.

Zoha Fatima is a researcher focused on Arctic governance and geopolitics. She recently completed her MSc in Diplomacy and International Security at the University of Strathclyde.